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DOES THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ACCEPT THE RULE
OF LAW? THE FINDINGS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
RESEARCH ON DEFERENCE TO AUTHORITY
Tom R. Tyler*
INTRODUCTION
This Article presents psychological research that explores the rea-
sons that people have for accepting the legitimacy of legal authorities
and deferring to their decisions. The findings of this research suggest
that Americans generally accept the principles underlying the rule of
law and defer to legal authorities when they believe that the authori-
ties are acting in accord with those principles. I will consider three
principles associated with the rule of law: rule-based decisionmaking,
respect for rights, and respect for persons.
This research indicates that each aspect of the three elements of the
rule of law strongly influences individual judgments about, and reac-
tions to, decisions made by judges and police officers. First, when le-
gal authorities act according to the principles of the rule of law, they
are viewed as just and trustworthy; this favorable view encourages
deference to their decisions. Second, when authorities act in accord
with the rule of law, they facilitate a general deference to the law in
people's everyday lives. Finally, people prefer having third-party au-
thorities regulate and manage conflicts that arise within public and
private arenas, as long as they perceive those authorities to be acting
in accord with the principles of the rule of law.
Based on these findings, this Article argues that the public contin-
ues to support the ideas underlying the rule of law. There are no signs
that trust and confidence in these principles are declining. However,
the results of public opinion polls suggest that many Americans be-
lieve that legal authorities do not actually act in accord with these
ideas. In particular, there are signs of low levels of trust and confi-
dence in legal authorities. Although they support the principles of the
* Tom R. Tyler is a University Professor at New York University. He teaches in the psychol-
ogy department and the law school. His research explores the dynamics of authority in groups,
organizations, and societies. In particular, he examines how judgments about the justice or injus-
tice of group procedures shape legitimacy, compliance, and cooperation.
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rule of law, Americans may be unwilling to defer to existing legal
authorities.
These findings suggest that there is a substantial reservoir of sup-
port among the American public for rules and decisions made by au-
thorities. This support, however, depends upon the behavior of the
authorities and the manner in which they exercise their authority.
Judges-whether local or national-need to conform their actions to
rule of law concepts. Based upon this analysis, I argue for an ap-
proach through which the legal system can create and maintain public
trust and confidence.
In particular, this Article explores whether there is evidence that
the American public is moving toward private law because it is unwill-
ing to accept the rule of law. In other words, it considers whether the
move toward private ordering that has been observed in the legal
arena can be explained as a response to the unwillingness of the
American public to defer to the law and to the decisions of legal au-
thorities. This reluctance could lead to an unwillingness to empower
third parties to resolve disputes or an unwillingness to accept the deci-
sions made by those third parties.
I argue that the public continues to want third parties-such as reg-
ulatory or legal authorities-to make decisions, and is willing to defer
to those decisions. That support, however, is based upon the belief
that those third parties will act in accord with principles defining the
rule of law. Hence, whether people prefer public solutions or private
solutions to important problems depends upon the character of the
public authorities involved.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Justice
What do people want from courts? One way to answer this ques-
tion is to explore the factors that shape public trust and confidence in
the courts. This might involve examining the public's general view of
the way that courts handle problems. It could also involve a consider-
ation of their personal reactions to their experiences in courts.1 In
either case, the questions are the same: What leads people to have
confidence in courts and to be satisfied with the way courts handle the
cases that come before them? Why do people defer to law and to the
decisions of legal authorities, in the sense that they feel obligated to
1. Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on
Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 871 (1997) (examining individuals' evaluations of
their personal experiences with the legal system).
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obey them? Why do people voluntarily defer to decisions made by
legal authorities and to the regulations those authorities create?
Interestingly, an extensive body of psychological research within the
area of procedural justice provides a clear and consistent answer to
this question. More than anything else, people react to whether they
believe that the courts are dealing with conflicts in a just manner. In
other words, people are very sensitive to the way in which public offi-
cials exercise their legal authority.2 They are concerned, in short, with
procedural justice.
The most direct evidence of this sensitivity to procedural justice
comes from interviews with people who have been personally in-
volved with courts. 3 People go to court for a variety of reasons. They
may be in court for help or may appear in response to a complaint
filed against them. Regardless of why they are there, people's reac-
tions to their dealings with legal authorities are most strongly shaped
by whether they think they have received a fair "day in court." In
particular, people are more likely to defer to decisions, both immedi-
ately and over time, when they view them as the product of a fair
process.4
The notion that people are more interested in how fairly their case
is handled than they are in whether they win might seem counterintui-
tive. Nevertheless, numerous studies conducted over the last several
decades have consistently found this to be true.5 Similarly, many stud-
ies indicate that general confidence in courts is linked to procedural
justice. A recent study of California state courts by David Rottman
(Rottman study) found this to be true.6 That study concluded that
"[h]aving a sense that court decisions are made through processes that
are fair is the strongest predictor by far of whether members of the
public approve of or have confidence in California courts."'7
2. For a review of early research on procedural justice, see E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). For a review of more recent stud-
ies, see Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000)
[hereinafter Tyler, Social Justice].
3. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERA-
TION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002).
4. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, in 30 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 283 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003) [hereinafter Tyler, Proce-
dural Justice].
5. Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 2 (reviewing these studies).
6. David B. Rottman, Trust and Confidence in the California Courts: A Survey of the Public
and Attorneys (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/4_37
pubtrustl.pdf (sampling over 2400 people chosen randomly from across the country and sug-
gesting that the key issue shaping public evaluations of the courts is their views regarding the
fairness of court procedures).
7. Id. at 6.
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What makes a process fair in the eyes of the public? Four critical
factors dominate evaluations of procedural justice.8 First, people want
to have an opportunity to state their case to legal authorities. 9 They
want to have a forum in which they can tell their story; they want to
have a "voice" in the decisionmaking process. Second, people react to
signs that the authorities with whom they are dealing are neutral.10
Neutrality involves making decisions based upon consistently applied
legal principles and the facts of the case rather than personal opinions
and biases. Transparency and openness foster the belief that decision-
making procedures are neutral. Third, people are sensitive to whether
they are treated with dignity and politeness and to whether their rights
as citizens and as people are respected. 1' Finally, people focus on cues
that communicate information about the intentions and character of
the legal authorities with whom they are dealing.' 2 People react fa-
vorably to the perception that the authorities are benevolent and car-
ing and are sincerely trying to do what is best for the public-that is,
when they trust that authority.1 3 Authorities communicate this con-
cern when they listen to people's accounts and explain or justify their
actions in ways that show an awareness of people's needs.1 4
Of course, this concern about fair procedures does not mean that
people do not care about the outcomes of their cases. No one wants
to lose. However, studies consistently find that procedural judgments
are more central to people's willingness to accept court decisions than
the favorability of the outcome.' 5 This is true with cases handled
through formal trials, as well as those handled through informal
processes such as mediation.
What is particularly striking about procedural justice judgments is
that they shape the reactions of those who are on the losing side of
cases. If people who do not receive a favorable outcome feel that the
outcome was arrived at in a just manner, they are more likely to ac-
cept it. Studies show that people continue to adhere to fair decisions
over time, 16 suggesting that their acceptance of those decisions is gen-
8. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 AD-
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1992).
9. Id. at 138-39.
10. Id. at 139-43.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Tyler & Lind, supra note 8, at 139-43.
15. Id. at 134-35.
16. Tyler, Social Justice, supra note 2, at 119-20; see, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Lawrence W. Sher-
man, Heather Strang, Geoffrey C. Barnes & Daniel J. Woods, Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural
Justice and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders' Psychological Mechanisms in the Can-
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uine and not simply the result of fear or coercion. Further, people
who experience procedural justice in court rate the courts and court
personnel favorably, indicating high levels of trust and confidence in
the court system.17
These same procedural justice judgments are also a key factor when
the general public evaluates the courts as institutions. The findings of
the Rottman study are typical of studies of trust and confidence in the
courts. For another example, consider a national survey of public
trust and confidence in state courts;18 this study also shows that public
evaluations of state courts are based upon assessments of the fairness
of court procedures. In particular, people were sensitive to whether
the courts protected their rights and to whether they thought that
judges were honest. While these procedural justice assessments were
the most important factor shaping trust and confidence in the courts,
the interviews showed that people were also sensitive to whether the
courts treated the members of different groups equally, and to other
structural issues of courts. However, their primary basis for evalua-
tion was procedural justice.
What is striking about both studies is that the results are true re-
gardless of the race, ethnicity, or economic status of the person in-
volved.' 9 Procedural justice concerns are central to people's reactions
to courts, regardless of who the people are. Since ethnicity and eco-
nomic status often shape people's views about what constitutes a fair
outcome, it is especially remarkable that there is a general willingness
to defer to fair procedures.
Further, there is also general agreement about what constitutes a
fair procedure. The four elements outlined-participation, neutrality,
treatment with dignity and respect, and trust in authorities-generally
shape reactions to the courts. The use of just procedures is, therefore,
an ideal way to bridge differences in backgrounds among disputants in
court.
The findings outlined in these studies suggest that people are fo-
cused on how legal decisions are being made. That same message
flows from the literature on procedural justice, which argues that eval-
berra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAw & Soc'y REV. (forthcoming 2007) (show-
ing that those adults who experience a fairer judicial procedure after being arrested for driving
while drunk are significantly more likely to obey the law several years after their offense).
17. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 4.
18. Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and
Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215
(2001).
19. Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Procedures
on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 LAW & Soc'y REV. 809 (1994).
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uations of legal authorities are strongly shaped by judgments about
the justice of the procedures through which these legal authorities ex-
ercise their authority.20 As has been shown in the analyses discussed
here, procedural justice shapes both decision acceptance2 l and general
compliance with the law.22
B. The Rule of Law
The idea of the rule of law has a long history within philosophies of
governance and jurisprudence. 23 It is central to early discussions
about American law, and is now widely articulated as an important
goal for reform throughout the world. As would be expected, such a
basic concept is explained in different ways by different authors. This
discussion will focus on three core ideas often associated with that
concept. 24
The first aspect of the rule of law is rule-based decisionmaking,
which has four elements. First, affected parties can present evidence
before decisions are made. Second, decisions are made based on facts
and not on personal opinions or biases. Third, rules are consistently
applied. Finally, procedures are transparent so people know how and
why decisions are being made.25
The second aspect of the rule of law is respect for people's rights
and for the principles embodied in the law. Two questions regarding
respect for rights and the law will be considered. First, are the deci-
sions consistent with the law, relevant rules, or standards? Second, do
legal authorities act in ways that respect an individual's legal rights?26
20. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 4.
21. TYLER & HUO, supra note 3.
22. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW].
23. See generally THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory
and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1 (Allan C. Hutchinson &
Patrick Monahan eds., 1987).
24. It is important to acknowledge that the ideas underlying the rule of law are broad and only
some are considered here. For example, the idea of democratically elected leaders is a given
element in American society and underlies the legitimacy of the legal and political systems. Sim-
ilarly, checks and balances among the branches of government are critical to democracy. These
structural elements are central to the effective rule of law, but will not be considered here.
25. Harry W. Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 145-46
(1958). The government needs to treat all persons equally, making decisions without regard for
race, religion, gender, or minority status. Decisions need to be made based upon clearly defined
laws and by people of integrity, acting on legal principles.
26. The government is bound to act in accord with the law and to uphold the rights of the
people. See generally R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN CON-
sTrrUTIONAL LAW (1995) (discussing the legal rights area concept central to Western democratic
governments); Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95 (1998).
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The third aspect of the rule of law is respect for persons. Here the
analysis examines the degree to which people are treated with cour-
tesy and politeness. The focus is on respect for people as individuals
who are entitled to treatment with dignity. 27
By analyzing prior research, I argue that the three ideas underlying
the rule of law are important because they shape two key judgments
about law and legal authorities: that legal authorities exercise their
authority through just procedures, and that legal authorities are trust-
worthy. These judgments of procedural justice and trustworthiness, in
turn, are the antecedents of deference to legal authority.
Of course, in some ways the connection between the elements of
the rule of law and procedural justice seems obvious based on the
previous discussion of psychological models of procedural justice. The
elements included in psychological definitions of procedural justice
are similar to those outlined above in the discussion of the rule of law.
Hence, it is not particularly surprising that these two perspectives are
connected in my analysis, which examines the antecedents of people's
general sense that the procedures being used are just. In psychologi-
cal studies, the elements of procedural justice shape overall views
about whether procedures are fair; similar elements of the rule of law
shape overall views of fairness. What is most important in both cases
is the comparison of the influence of these elements to the influence
of the alternative models outlined below.
The alternative model tested was that people are more willing to
accept decisions that they judge to be either favorable or fair. It
seems straightforward to imagine that the key issue shaping deference
is the outcome of the decision itself. If people view the outcome as
favorable, they should be more willing to accept it. Some scholars
argue that people are more nuanced; they are not necessarily seeking
favorable decisions, but are simply seeking decisions that they judge
to provide a fair or equitable outcome.28 In either case, the argument
is that people focus on the outcome, rather than whether it was ob-
tained in ways that reflect "the rule of law." Hence, people are
viewed as approaching issues in terms of self-interest, in that they fo-
cus on the desirability of the outcomes of a procedure, rather than
questions about the process itself.
27. It is also important to respect every person's dignity and humanity. It has been recognized
that adherence to rules is not enough, since rules may themselves be inconsistent with principles
of decency and justice. Hence, the content of rules must be evaluated for consistency with ideas
of human rights. See generally BLANDINE KRIEGEL, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW (Marc
A. LePain & Jeffery C. Cohen trans., 1995).
28. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL ANALYSIS (1975).
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How do the elements of the rule of law relate to procedural justice?
There is a great deal of overlap between the two. For example, the
questions asked in the Rottman study on procedural justice can be
mapped onto the elements of the rule of law. Thus, to assess rule-
based decisionmaking, people were asked whether "court decisions
are unbiased. '29 To assess respect for rights, people were asked
whether "courts protect constitutional rights" and whether "courts
make sure judges follow the rules. ' 30 Finally, people were asked
whether the courts respect people by treating them "with dignity. '31
The Rottman study found that the majority of Californians believe
that courts act in ways that are consistent with each element of the
rule of law.32 The highest ratings were for respect for people, the low-
est for factual decisionmaking, with respect for rights in the middle.
But in each case, there were also substantial minorities of 20% to 30%
that believed that courts did not follow the principles of the rule of
law. The study argues that people's reactions to the courts are shaped
by the degree to which the courts act in accord with these elements of
the rule of law.
III. THE RULE OF LAW AS AN EMPIRICAL ISSUE
I argue first that the rule of law is based upon a willingness to defer
to legal authorities-that is, to their decisions and to the laws they
create-if those decisions and laws are created and implemented fol-
lowing the principles of the rule of law. If the processes through
which legal authorities exercise their authority conform to the princi-
ples of the rule of law, then the laws made and decisions reached
should be more readily and willingly accepted.
A. Deference to the Law During Personal Experiences
1. Methodology
A key criterion for evaluating the law is whether people defer to the
decisions of legal authorities. Such deference was the focus of a study
that Professor Yuen Huo and I conducted in Oakland and Los Ange-
les, California; the results of that study will be used to test the key
arguments advanced here.33 In that study, people with recent per-
29. Rottman, supra note 6, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. TYLER & Huo, supra note 3, at 28-45. The study was designed to include approximately
equal numbers of White, African-American, and Hispanic respondents. To achieve this goal, the
[Vol. 56:661
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sonal experience with the police or the courts were interviewed, 34 with
a total of 1656 interviews conducted. The final sample included 586
Whites, 561 African-Americans, and 509 Hispanics. 35
The primary agency dealt with was the police, with whom people
had 86% of their personal contacts. A smaller group of people de-
scribed experiences with courts, with which people had 14% of their
personal contacts. 36 In each case, the survey focused on people's will-
ingness to defer to the decisions made by the legal authority with
whom they were dealing.37
In the context of a specific legal decision, deference was measured
in three ways. First, the person's willingness to voluntarily accept the
decision was noted.38 Second, interviewers recorded people's expres-
sions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with -the decision made by the
police officer or the judge. 39 Third, people indicated their favorable
or unfavorable feelings toward the authority involved in making the
decision.40 My analysis combines these three aspects of deference into
a single indicator.
Do people defer to legal authorities because those authorities fol-
low the principles enshrined in the rule of law? I will examine a two-
stage model in which the elements of the rule of law shape judgments
of procedural justice and trustworthiness, which in turn influence the
willingness to defer to the law. This model is drawn from my prior
work on deference to legal authority-work which identified procedu-
study oversampled the areas of the cities involved known to have higher proportions of minori-
ties. Id. at 29-31 (detailing the sampling approach).
34. Id. at 30. Interviewers reached a sample of the population of the two cities by telephone.
However, only those with recent personal experience were interviewed, so those interviewed do
not reflect the larger population that was sampled. The demographics of those with recent per-
sonal experience with legal authorities may not match the demographics of the general
population.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Some people dealt with more than one authority. In that case, they were asked to think
about the person they felt was most important in shaping their experience.
38. 1 selected four items to measure deference: (1) "1 willingly accepted the decision"; (2) "In
a similar situation in the future, I would like to see the situation handled in the same way"; (3) "I
considered going to someone else to try to change the decision"; and (4) "The situation could
have been handled better." TYLER & Huo, supra note 3, at 44.
39. 1 selected two items to measure satisfaction with the authority: (1) "The person generally
did a good job dealing with my situation" and (2) "1 was generally satisfied with the way he/she
handled the situation." Id.
40. The questionnaire upon which the analysis in Trust in the Law is based is available from
the author. I selected three items to measure views about the authority: How much do you
"respect," "like," and "fear" the authority.
20071
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ral justice and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer
to legal authorities. 41
Procedural justice involves the fairness of the manner in which au-
thorities exercise their authority. Thus, people were asked whether
they felt that the authority with whom they dealt had made decisions
in ways that reflected the use of just procedures.
Trust is linked to inferences about the character of the authorities
with whom individuals are dealing. When people encounter an au-
thority figure, they try to infer from the authority's actions whether
that person should be trusted. To assess trustworthiness, people at-
tempt to infer whether the authority is benevolent and caring and is
trying to do the right thing for those involved in the situation. 42
The influence of these factors is compared to that of two other fac-
tors shaping deference: the favorability 43 and the fairness44 of deci-
sions. Again, an alternative reason that people might accept decisions
is that they view them as favorable or fair. It seems generally self-
evident that people are more likely to defer to decisions that are
favorable to themselves.
2. Procedural Justice, Trust, and Deference
Do procedural justice and trust shape deference? 45 First, consider
situations in which people go to court. Taken together, procedural
41. TYLER & Huo, supra note 3, at 49-96 (discussing an overall model of the antecedents of
decision acceptance during personal experiences with legal authorities).
42. I selected five items to measure trust: (1) The authority "considered my views"; (2) The
authority "tried to do the right thing by me"; (3) The authority "tried to take my needs into
account"; (4) The authority "cared about my concerns"; and (5) The authority "is someone I
trust." Id. at 68.
43. Decision favorability was measured by combining observer ratings of the valence of the
decision with self-reports indicating whether those involved experienced the outcome as
favorable or unfavorable. Id. at 37-42.
44. Respondents were asked whether the decision was better or worse than they deserved
according to principles of distributive justice. Id. at 52-57.
45. 1 used regression analysis to test the influence of procedural justice, trust, and other fac-
tors on deference. In such an analysis, a set of factors (independent variables) are used to ex-
plain differences among those in the study on some target (dependent) variable. If the
independent variables completely explained differences on the dependent variable, they would
explain 100% of the variance, while 0% would indicate that they explained nothing. Within the
overall analysis, the influence of each independent variable can be compared by looking at its
relative beta weight (standardized regression coefficients). This reflects the relative influence of
different factors. So, for example, a beta weight of 0.30 is twice as large as a beta weight of 0.15.
In addition, the analysis tests the likelihood that an effect is statistically significant. The higher
the coefficient, the less likely it is that it would be produced by chance if, in fact, there is no
connection between the variables. So, when the probability of an effect is p < 0.05 that means
that an effect of that size would be generated less than 5 in 100 times if the two variables are
unrelated. The statement p < 0.01 means that an effect of that size would be generated less than
1 in 100 times if the two variables are unrelated, and p < 0.001 means less than 1 in 1000 times. If
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justice, trust, and outcome judgments explain 82% of the variance in
deference to decisions made by judges. 46 Considered alone, procedu-
ral justice and trust explain 79% of the variance. Hence, when they
deal with the courts, people are primarily focused on issues of proce-
dural justice and trust, not outcome favorability or outcome fairness.47
This is consistent with the prior findings of the literature on procedu-
ral justice and trust.
When people deal with the police, the same four judgments explain
85% of the variance in deference. Procedural justice and trust to-
gether explain 84%. Again, when they deal with the police, people
focus primarily on procedural justice and on trust, rather than on out-
come favorability or outcome fairness.48 These findings are consistent
with what Huo and I argued when we suggested that procedural jus-
tice and trust are the key antecedents of deference.49
While both factors matter, the results of the analysis repeatedly
point to trust as especially important in experiences with legal authori-
ties. This is consistent with prior evidence suggesting that when peo-
ple are dealing with particular authorities, inferences about the
trustworthiness of those authorities are central to their reactions.50
3. Indices Reflecting the Rule of Law
To test the argument that the rule of law matters, an index of each
of the three aspects of the rule of law was created. The first aspect of
the rule of law involves rule-based decisionmaking. Respondents
were asked whether the authority allowed them to tell their story,
made neutral decisions, consistently applied rules, and acted transpar-
an effect is found that is highly unlikely to have occurred by chance if two variables are truly not
related, we say that there is strong evidence that they are significantly related in statistical terms.
46. The results were computed by the author using the data set described. Details of the
analysis are available from the author.
47. A regression equation including all four factors indicates significant influences of procedu-
ral justice (beta = 0.33, p < 0.001); trust (beta = 0.50, p < 0.001); and distributive justice (beta =
0.22, p < 0.001). Outcome favorability had no significant influence.
48. A regression equation including all four factors indicates significant influences of procedu-
ral justice (beta = 0.26, p < 0.001); trust (beta = 0.61, p < 0.001); distributive justice (beta = 0.08, p
< 0.001); and outcome favorability (beta = 0.07, p < 0.001).
49. These findings are not identical to ours because this analysis employs a narrower defini-
tion of procedural justice than we used. TYLER & Huo, supra note 3, at 49-96. In this analysis,
procedural justice focuses directly upon issues of decisionmaking, and does not consider issues of
interpersonal treatment, which we examined in our previous study. Id.; see also Tyler & Lind,
supra note 8 (discussing the importance of interpersonal treatment).
50. Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Mo-
tive Attributions on Willingness to Accept Decisions, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS
OF THEORY AN) RESEARCH 331 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
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ently. 5t The second aspect of the rule of law involves respect for
rights. Respondents were asked whether the authorities made deci-
sions consistent with the law and whether they acknowledged and
showed concern for people's rights.52 Finally, respect for persons in-
volves treating people with respect, courtesy, and dignity during legal
procedures. 53
The scales used to assess the perceived rule of law ranged from 1 to
4, with 4 reflecting strong agreement that rule of law elements were
present, and 1 indicating strong disagreement. An examination of the
average level of rule-based decisionmaking indicated an average of
2.98 for courts and 3.10 for the police. Average respect for the law
was 2.87 for courts and 2.98 for the police. Average respect for people
was 3.25 for courts and 3.27 for the police. As in the Rottman study,
in which people rated the general characteristics of courts, the ratings
of personal experience in this study were somewhat favorable. Cer-
tainly, these ratings were higher than ratings of outcome fairness. The
mean outcome fairness was 2.68 for courts and 2.76 for the police.
Authorities were rated moderately or favorably on scales assessing
the degree to which they acted in accordance with principles of the
rule of law. These findings, which come from judgments of particular
experiences with legal authorities in California, are generally similar
to the global ratings reported in the Rottman study. They suggest that
the public is somewhat favorable in its rating of the actions of legal
authorities, seeing those actions as consistent with the rule of law. On
the other hand, the ratings are intermediate, and do not reflect univer-
sally high levels. People indicated that the authorities with whom they
dealt acted in ways that were generally consistent with the principles
of the rule of law, but they did not give those authorities the highest
possible ratings.
51. I selected five items to measure neutrality: (1) "How fair are the procedures he/she used
to make decisions about how to handle the situation?"; (2) "I had an opportunity to describe my
situation before he/she made a decision about how to handle it"; (3) The authority "made deci-
sions based on the facts"; (4) The authority "treated me the same as he/she would treat anyone
else in the same situation"; and (5) "I understood why I was treated as I was." TYLER & Huo,
supra note 3, at 54, 83, 85, 152.
52. Two items were used to measure respect for rights: (1) "According to the law, I received
the outcome I deserved" and (2) The authority "showed concern for my rights." Id. at 54, 83.
53. Three items were used to measure respect for persons: (1) "Overall, how fairly are you
treated?"; (2) The authority "treated me politely"; and (3) The authority "treated me with dig-
nity and respect." Id. at 83, 149.
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4. Analysis
Did people's willingness to defer to the decisions made by the au-
thorities change depending upon the degree to which the authorities
acted in ways consistent with the rule of law? To test this argument,
judgments about the degree to which the behavior of the authorities
was consistent with the rule of law were examined using regression
analysis.
The analysis indicates that, for those people dealing with courts, a
combined equation including indices of the rule of law and of outcome
valence explains 73% of the variance in procedural justice, 79% of the
variance in trust, and 81% of the variance in the willingness to defer.
For those dealing with the police, the equation accounts for 75% of
the variance in procedural justice, 83% of the variance in trust, and
84% of willingness to defer. Hence, most of the variance in people's
reactions to their personal experiences is explained by the judgments
contained within this study.
As was true in the prior analysis, outcome judgments have very lit-
tle to do with procedural justice or trust. In the case of courts, 73% of
the variance in procedural justice, 78% of the variance in judgments
of trust, and 80% of the variance in deference is explained by rule of
law judgments. Hence, we can understand these overall judgments
equally well with or without information about outcomes. Similarly,
in the police analysis, 75% of the variance in procedural justice, 83%
of the variance in trust, and 84% of the variance in deference is ex-
plained by rule of law judgments alone. Outcomes were again basi-
cally irrelevant. People react to their experiences largely in terms of
the degree to which they judged that the authorities did or did not act
in terms of the ideas underlying the rule of law.
Another approach to this question examines how much weight peo-
ple put on their outcomes and on rule of law judgments when consid-
ered together. 54 First, one must consider whether people believe that
the authorities acted with procedural justice. When dealing with the
courts, procedural justice reflected rule-based decisionmaking, 55 re-
spect for rights,56 and respect for persons. 57 The primary factor was
54. In a regression analysis all the terms included are studied at one time. The analysis re-
ports beta weights, which reflect the degree of influence of one factor, while removing the influ-
ence of other factors. Beta weights are standardized, which means that their relative size reflects
their relative strength of influence. Each coefficient is tested to see if the amount of influence
for that factor is significantly different than no influence (zero). Only coefficients found to be
significantly different from zero are included here. If coefficients are not significant, they are
presented as reflecting no influence.
55. Beta = 0.49, p < 0.001.
56. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.001.
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rule-based decisionmaking. In contrast, neither outcome favorabil-
ity58 nor outcome fairness 59 was important. With the police, procedu-
ral justice was linked to rule-based decisionmaking, 60 respect for
rights, 6' respect for persons,62 and outcome favorability. 63 Again, the
primary factor was rule-based decisionmaking. If the authorities ac-
ted based upon the neutral application of rules, people thought they
were acting in accord with fair procedures. In this case, outcomes
were not totally ignored, but they had only a secondary influence.
Second, consider the issue of trust. When dealing with the courts,
people's trust was shaped by rule-based decisionmaking, 64 respect for
rights, 65 and respect for persons, 66 but not by outcomes. 67 When deal-
ing with the police, people's trust was linked to rule-based decision-
making,68 respect for rights,69 respect for persons,70 and outcome
favorability. 71 Trust in courts was linked primarily to respect for peo-
ple's rights, while trust in the police was linked primarily to rule-based
decisionmaking and respect for persons. Again, outcomes were not a
primary factor shaping trust.
Finally, consider the direct influence of rule of law judgments on the
willingness to defer to authority. When dealing with courts, deference
was based on rule-based decisionmaking, 72 respect for rights,73 respect
for persons, 74 and outcome fairness. 75 When interacting with the po-
lice, deference was based on rule-based decisionmaking, 76 respect for
57. Beta = 0.25, p < 0.001.
58. Beta = -0.02, not significant.
59. Beta = 0.01, not significant.
60. Beta = 0.45, p < 0.001.
61. Beta = 0.18, p < 0.001.
62. Beta = 0.25, p < 0.001.
63. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.001 for outcome favorability; beta = -0.01, not significant for outcome
fairness.
64. Beta = 0.27, p < 0.001.
65. Beta = 0.54, p < 0.001.
66. Beta = 0.24, p < 0.001.
67. Beta = 0.04, not significant for outcome favorability; beta = 0.14, p < 0.001 for outcome
fairness.
68. Beta = 0.37, p < 0.001.
69. Beta = 0.25, p < 0.001.
70. Beta = 0.34, p < 0.001.
71. Beta = 0.05, p < 0.01 for outcome favorability; beta = -0.01, not significant for outcome
fairness.
72. Beta = 0.42, p < 0.001.
73. Beta = 0.27, p < 0.001.
74. Beta = 0.20, p < 0.001.
75. Beta = 0.13, p < 0.001 for outcome fairness; beta = -0.05, not significant for outcome
favorability.
76. Beta = 0.39, p < 0.001.
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rights,77 respect for persons, 78 outcome favorability,79 and outcome
fairness.80 With both the police and courts, willing deference occurred
when the authorities were judged to be engaged in rule-based deci-
sionmaking, and outcome judgments had only a minor influence.
These findings indicate that variations in the empirical approach
produce basically the same results-the rule of law is important. Re-
spondents defer to decisions made by judges and police officers when
they believe those officials are exercising their authority in ways con-
sistent with the principles of the rule of law. This empirical approach
demonstrates the importance of the rule of law by showing that the
ability of courts and the police to gain the public's acceptance is de-
pendent upon public judgments that courts and the police are acting in
ways that are consistent with the rule of law. It also shows that both
procedural justice and trust shape deference, and that the elements of
the rule of law are important in shaping procedural justice and trust.
What emerges is that trust is most central to deference among those
who deal with both the police and the courts. This focus on trust sug-
gests that people are less concerned with what authorities do than
with who the authorities are-the nature of their character and moti-
vation. This does not mean that we should ignore issues of procedural
justice. In fact, the data on personal experiences with the police and
courts suggest that both procedural justice and trust shape defer-
ence.8 ' Trust, however, is crucial-it is strongly linked to the rule of
law. The key message that these findings send to legal authorities
seeking deference to their decisions is that the public responds based
on its assessments of how they exercise their authority. Deference is
not automatic.
B. Deference Toward the Law in Everyday Life
Rather than focus only upon deference in particular situations, we
can also consider general reactions to the law in people's everyday
lives. In the case of people's broader relationship to legal authority,
the question is not deference to a particular decision, but general sup-
port for and deference to the law. The question is the same: Do peo-
ple defer to the law because they view the law as operating in
accordance with the principles of the rule of law?
77. Beta = 0.20, p < 0.001.
78. Beta = 0.32, p < 0.001.
79. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.001.
80. Beta = 0.04, p < 0.01.
81. See TYLER & Huo, supra note 3, at 76-96.
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1. Methodology
My examination of this issue is based upon a survey of the residents
of New York City.82 The analysis focused on the police and people's
willingness to defer to and cooperate with police officers. While the
focus of this study is on the police, not the courts, prior research sug-
gests that people's reasons for deferring to the police and the courts in
their everyday lives are similar. 83
This analysis uses a general measure of deference that combines
viewing the law as legitimate, 84 complying with the law, 85 and cooper-
ating with the police to fight crime.8 6 Such an orientation toward the
law reflects a general willingness to cooperate with legal authorities by
following their directives and deferring to their decisions.
2. Procedural Justice, Trust, and General Deference
In considering general deference, I used the same approach that I
used to explore the factors shaping deference to particular decisions.
That approach first considers the roles of procedural justice 87 and
trust 88 in shaping general deference. The argument, as before, is that
82. Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping
Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513 (2003).
83. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW, supra note 22.
84. I selected nineteen items to measure legitimacy: (1) "Overall, the NYPD is a legitimate
authority and people should obey the decisions that NYPD officers make"; (2) "I have confi-
dence that the NYPD can do its job well"; (3) "I trust the leaders of the NYPD to make deci-
sions that are good for everyone in the city"; (4) "You should accept the decisions made by
police, even if you think they are wrong"; (5) "You should do what the police tell you to do even
when you do not understand the reasons for their decisions"; (6) "You should do what the police
tell you to do, even when you disagree with their decisions"; (7) "You should do what the police
tell you to do even when you do not like the way they treat you"; (8) "There are times when it is
ok for you to ignore what the police tell you"; (9) "Sometimes you have to bend the law for
things to come out right"; (10) "The law represents the values of the people in power, rather
than the values of people like you"; (11) "People in power use the law to try to control people
like you"; (12) "The law does not protect your interests"; (13) "The police care about the well-
being of everyone they deal with"; (14) "People's basic rights are well protected by the police";
(15) "The police are often dishonest"; (16) "Some of the things the police do embarrass our
city"; (17) "There are many things about the NYPD and its policies that need to be changed";
(18) "I am proud of the work of the NYPD"; and (19) "I agree with many of the values that
define what the NYPD stands for." Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 82, app. B at 543.
85. Respondents were asked how frequently they complied with seven everyday laws. Id. app.
B at 544.
86. Respondents were asked about their willingness to help the police by reporting crime and
criminals. Id.
87. I selected one question: Do the police "make decisions about how to handle problems in
fair ways?" Id. app. B at 542.
88. I selected two items: (1) Whether the police "take account of people's needs and con-
cerns?" and (2) Whether the police "consider people's opinions when deciding what to do?" Id.
app. B at 543.
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if people believe that legal authorities act in accordance with princi-
ples of procedural justice and are trustworthy, they will defer to those
legal authorities by following the law in their everyday lives.
The role of procedural justice and trust is compared to four indices
of police performance: (1) the perceived quality of police perform-
ance,8 9 (2) fear of crime victimization, 90 (3) an assessment of neigh-
borhood conditions, 91 and (4) the perceived risk of being sanctioned
for rulebreaking. 92 These indices reflect various ways of evaluating
the quality of police performance. They reflect the notion that people
cooperate with the police when they believe that the police are effec-
tively controlling crime and disorder.
An examination of the mean level of the variables suggests a similar
conclusion to the one found in the examination of particular exper-
iences. People's views about the rule of law characteristics of the po-
lice were assessed on a scale ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 being highly
positive and 1 being highly negative. The mean level of procedural
justice was 3.42; the mean level for trust was 3.02. Rule-based deci-
sionmaking was 3.01, with respect for rights at 3.16 and respect for
persons at 3.29. Personal distributive justice was 2.51, with group-
based distributive justice at 2.29, performance at 3.29, risk of sanction-
ing at 2.69, fear of crime victimization at 3.15, and neighborhood
crime conditions at 2.91.
3. Analysis
Do judgments of procedural justice and trust influence deference?
Taken together, these indices explain 24% of the variance in general
deference. As in the prior analyses, procedural justice and trust ac-
count for 22% of the variance, suggesting that instrumental indicators
of police performance have little to do with general deference. People
89. I selected three items: (1) "How effective are the police in fighting crime in your neigh-
borhood?"; (2) "When people call the police for help, how quickly do they respond?"; and (3)
"How effective are the police at helping people who ask for help?" Id. app. B at 544.
90. 1 selected four items: (1) "How safe is your neighborhood during the day?"; (2) "How
safe is your neighborhood in the evening?"; (3) "How much do you worry about your home
being burglarized?"; and (4) "How much do you worry about being robbed, assaulted, or
mugged on the street?" Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 81, app. B at 544.
91. I selected eight items: In your neighborhood: (1) "How often do you see garbage in the
streets?"; (2) "How often do you see empty beer bottles on the streets?"; (3) "How often do you
see graffiti on the walls"; (4) "How often do you see gangs hanging out on the streets"; (5) "How
often do you see people buying beer, wine, or liquor on the street"; (6) "How often do you see
people buying or selling drugs on the street"; (7) "How high is the crime rate in your neighbor-
hood?"; and (8) "In the past year, has the crime rate been increasing?" Id.
92. Respondents were asked how likely it is that they would be caught and punished for com-
mitting seven everyday crimes.
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defer to law and to legal authorities primarily because they trust those
authorities and think they are exercising their authority through just
procedures.
When we consider the separate factors involved, we find that trust is
the most important factor 93 and that procedural justice has a secon-
dary influence. 94 General deference is also higher if there are credible
risks of sanctions,95 in neighborhoods with low crime, 96 and with effec-
tive police.97 As was true with particular decisions, people's general
deference is more strongly related to trust than it is to procedural jus-
tice, but both procedural justice and trust again play distinct roles in
encouraging general deference.
4. The Influence of the Rule of Law
The key issue of concern is the influence of people's judgments
about the three elements of the rule of law: rule-based decisionmak-
ing,98 respect for rights, 99 and respect for persons.100 We can compare
the influence of these indicators of the rule of law to indices of crime
and police performance in fighting crime. We can also compare the
influence of the rule of law to indices of police distributive fairness.
Two such indices are considered: fairness to groups'0 1 and fairness to
the respondent. 0 2
First, do judgments regarding the rule of law explain whether peo-
ple think that the police are acting with procedural justice? Overall,
37% of the variance in procedural justice was explained by rule of law
judgments and outcome judgments considered together, and 37% was
explained by rule of law judgments alone. In other words, outcome
93. Beta = 0.31, p < 0.001.
94. Beta = 0.11, p < 0.001.
95. Beta = 0.08, p < 0.05.
96. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.01.
97. Beta = 0.13, p < 0.001.
98. I selected four items: (1) The police "make their decisions based upon facts, not their
personal biases or opinions"; (2) The police "try to get the facts in a situation before deciding
how to act"; (3) The police "apply the rules consistently to different people"; and (4) The police
"consider the views of the people involved when deciding what to do." Sunshine & Tyler, supra
note 82, app. B at 546.
99. I selected two items: (1) The police "respect people's rights" and (2) The police "usually
accurately understand and apply the law." Id. app. B at 546-47.
100. I selected two items: (1) The police "treat people fairly" and (2) The police "treat people
with dignity and respect." Id.
101. Do the police distribute police services fairly across demographic groups? Eight groups
were mentioned, including Hispanics, African-Americans, the poor, and the wealthy. Id. app. B
at 545.
102. The question was, "Do the police distribute police services fairly to people like you?"
(questionnaire on file with author).
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judgments, including the fairness of the distribution of police services,
do not add to the ability to understand deference to the police. In this
analysis, the key issues were respect for persons' 0 3 and respect for
rights. 04 The quality of police performance' 0 5 and neighborhood con-
ditions were also influential.10 6 The central concern underlying proce-
dural justice, however, is respect for persons.
Does the rule of law shape trust in the police? Overall, 65% of the
variance in trust was explained, and 65% was explained by the rule of
law factors alone. The key issues were rule-based decisionmaking, 10 7
respect for rights,108 and respect for persons.10 9 In addition, police
performance mattered."10 But the key judgment underlying trust is
rule-based decisionmaking.
Finally, what is the direct influence of the rule of law on general
deference to the police and to the law? Overall, 31% of the variance
was explained, and 27% was explained by the rule of law factors
alone. The key factors were rule-based decisionmaking,"' respect for
rights," 2 and respect for persons.' 3 In addition, risk had a minor in-
fluence on deference," 14 as did distributive justice to groups." 5 Defer-
ence is directly influenced by rule-based decisionmaking and respect
for people's rights.
These findings support those already outlined regarding deference
to specific decisions. They suggest that general deference to legal au-
thorities is shaped largely by the elements of the rule of law. What do
they tell us about the relationship between the rule of law and defer-
ence, both to particular decisions and to the law in everyday life?
They support the arguments already outlined in the literature on pro-
cedural justice. People's deference to legal authorities is generally
based on issues that are linked to both procedural justice and trust. 116
103. Beta = 0.51, p < 0.001.
104. Beta = 0.07, p < 0.10.
105. Beta = 0.06, p < 0.05.
106. Beta = 0.06, p < 0.05.
107. Beta = 0.36, p < 0.001.
108. Beta = 0.26, p < 0.001.
109. Beta = 0.19, p < 0.001.
110. Beta = 0.08, p < 0.001.
111. Beta = 0.19. p < 0.001.
112. Beta = 0.15, p < 0.001.
113. Beta = 0.10, p < 0.001.
114. Beta = 0.06, p < 0.05.
115. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.001.
116. The greater influence of trust relative to procedural justice reported here seems inconsis-
tent with the more central role that procedural justice plays in other studies. See, e.g., TYLER &
Huo, supra note 3, at 49-96. The reason for the difference is that in most studies, procedural
justice includes both quality of decisionmaking and quality of overall interpersonal treatment.
2007] 679
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Neither the performance of the authorities nor the decisions they
render are key antecedents of deference.
In the case of the elements of the rule of law, the central aspect
shaping deference is rule-based decisionmaking, which includes fac-
tual decisionmaking, the consistent application of rules, and the lack
of prejudice and bias. In addition, people pay attention to whether
the authorities are respecting their rights and respecting them as peo-
ple. So, the ability of the rule of law to be an effective basis for the
exercise of legal authority seems clearly supported by the findings out-
lined here.
C. Deference to the U.S. Supreme Court
The argument that adherence to the rule of law leads to deference
to the courts has also been made on the national level. For example,
Professor Gregory Mitchell and I explored factors shaping deference
to the Supreme Court in a survey of a sample of the residents of the
San Francisco Bay area.117 Our study examined whether people were
more willing to defer to the decisions of the Court, including contro-
versial decisions such as the decision to allow abortions, if they be-
lieved that the Court adhered to the principles underlying the rule of
law.118
1. Methodology
The focus of the Supreme Court study was deference to the role of
the Court in interpreting the Constitution.1 9 People were asked
whether they believed that the Court ought to have the authority to
determine the meaning of the Constitution. As in the analyses al-
ready outlined, the study examined the degree to which assessments
of the Court's role were shaped by (1) judgments about whether the
Court made decisions through procedural justice,120 (2) trust in the
In this study only quality of decisionmaking is considered, lowering the impact of procedural
justice evaluations.
117. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703
(1994).
118. Id. at 712.
119. I selected two questions: (1) "Some people feel that we should get rid of the U.S. Su-
preme Court, while others are opposed to the idea. How do you feel?" and (2) "Some people
feel that if the U.S. Supreme Court were to continually make decisions that most people disagree
with, we should do away with the Court altogether." Id. app. B at 803-04.
120. I selected two questions: (1) "Overall, the way the Supreme Court makes its decisions is
fair" and (2) "The way the U.S. Supreme Court decides whether laws are constitutional is fair."
Id. app. B at 808.
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Court, 12' or (3) agreement with Court decisions. 122 Again, it seems
natural to imagine that people would more willingly defer to the
Court if they agreed with its decisions. However, the essence of the
rule of law is that people defer to the Court if it adheres to principles,
even if the result is unfavorable.
2. Analysis
The first empirical question examined the antecedents of deference
to the Court. Deference is linked to judgments about the Court's pro-
cedural justice, 123 to trust in the Court,124 and to agreement with
Court decisions. 125 The procedural justice of the Court's decision-
making procedures is the most important element shaping deference
to its authority.
What about the influence of the elements of the rule of law? The
study did not measure respect for persons, but it did measure rule-
based decisionmaking 26 and respect for rights.' 27 The influence of
these factors can again be compared to that of agreement with the
Court's decisions. The empirical analysis indicates that evaluations of
the Court's procedural justice are shaped by respect for rights,128 rule-
based decisionmaking, 129 and by agreement with decisions.1 30 Trust in
the Court is shaped by respect for rights, 13' rule-based decisionmak-
121. I selected four items: (1) "The U.S. Supreme Court can usually be trusted to make deci-
sions that are right for the country as a whole"; (2) "How often are the decisions made by the
Supreme Court fair?"; (3) "The Supreme Court tries to be fair when making its decisions"; and
(4) "The Supreme Court justices are generally honest-giving the real reasons for their deci-
sions." Id. app. B at 803, 811-12.
122. Respondents were asked, "How often do you agree with the decisions that the Supreme
Court makes?" Id. app. B at 808.
123. Beta = 0.30, p < 0.001.
124. Beta = 0.12, p < 0.05.
125. Beta = 0.11, p < 0.05; overall, 20% of the variance in deference was explained.
126. Respondents were asked two questions: (1) "The Supreme Court gives equal considera-
tion to the views of all of the different groups in America" and (2) "The Supreme Court gets the
kind of information it needs to make informed decisions." Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 117, app.
B at 811.
127. Two items were used: (1) "Our basic rights are well protected by the U.S. Supreme
Court" and (2) "The Supreme Court is concerned about protecting the average citizen's rights."
Id. app. B at 803, 812.
128. Beta = 0.43, p < 0.001.
129. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.001.
130. Beta = 0.13, p < 0.01; overall, 40% of the variance was explained.
131. Beta = 0.46, p < 0.001.
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ing,132 and agreement with decisions. 133 Deference to the Court is di-
rectly shaped by respect for rights 34 and agreement with decisions. 135
Overall, this empirical analysis of public deference to the Court's
role as an interpreter of the Constitution supports the argument that
people defer to the Court when they believe it acts in accord with the
principles of the rule of law. People defer to the Court primarily
when they think it uses fair procedures when making its decisions, and
this procedural justice influence is clearly stronger than agreement or
disagreement with Court decisions. Procedural justice and trust in the
Court are primarily a function of the belief that the Court respects
people's rights. Hence, the key element of the rule of law that is im-
portant in the case of the Supreme Court is its respect for people's
rights.
D. Deference to Government and Regulatory Authority: Do People
Prefer Private Solutions to Problems in Their Lives?
Another important question is whether people prefer to resolve
personal and social conflicts privately rather than using regulatory au-
thorities. It is certainly reasonable to expect that people would prefer
to retain control over decisions that influence their lives. Consistent
with this argument, early models of procedural justice presented an
image of people as resistant to giving up control over decisions to a
third party.136 Several studies speak to this issue by examining
whether and why people are willing to accept third-party decisions
about issues that are important to them.
1. Resolving Public Distribution Problems
a. Methodology
Professor Peter Degoey and I interviewed residents of the San
Francisco Bay area about how they wanted to resolve a social conflict
over the allocation of a scarce resource-water during a drought. 137
The 401 respondents in the study were given a number of choices,
including allocation through free markets in which the price of water
was raised until supply and demand were balanced, or allocation
132. Beta = 0.30, p < 0.001.
133. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.001; overall, 63% of the variance was explained.
134. Beta = 0.26, p < 0.001.
135. Beta = 0.14, p < 0.01; overall, 16% of the variance was explained.
136. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 28.
137. Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural Jus-
tice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 482, 485 (1995).
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through the decisions of regulatory authorities who would make rules
shaping water use. 138 When asked whether households should decide
how much water to consume through market decisions, only 28% said
this was a desirable approach, while 73% indicated that government
authorities should decide to whom water is allocated and 74% indi-
cated that there should be legal rules to shape the allocation of water.
People generally preferred a regulatory solution.
b. Analysis
Why did people believe that regulatory authorities should have
power to decide? To determine this, people were asked to indicate
their views about the actions of the Public Utilities Commission
(PUC), the regulatory body that makes and enforces water use rules.
If people thought that the PUC made decisions through fair proce-
dures, they more strongly supported the use of government authority
to resolve the conflict. 139 Trust in the authority did not matter. 140
Similarly, the favorability of past decisions of the PUC for the respon-
dent did not shape views about the desirability of government
action.141
Those people who said that the regulatory agency made decisions
fairly indicated that they personally would be more likely to volunta-
rily defer to regulatory decisions.' 42 Neither trust 143 nor decision
favorability 144 shaped personal intentions. People were also asked
about other people in their community. They indicated that if the
PUC was trusted, most people in the community would defer to its
decisions.' 45 Procedural justice 46 and decision favorability 47 influ-
enced what respondents thought most people in the community would
do.148 Finally, people indicated that the government was likely to
manage water effectively if it made its decisions fairly 149 and if those
decisions were favorable. 150 People did not believe that trust in the
138. Id.
139. Beta = 0.16, p < 0.01.
140. Beta = 0.03, not significant.
141. Beta = 0.08, not significant; overall, 4% of the variance was explained.
142. Beta = 0.41, p < 0.001.
143. Beta = 0.00, not significant.
144. Beta = 0.06, not significant; overall, 18% of the variance was explained.
145. Beta = 0.18, p < 0.01.
146. Beta = 0.01, not significant.
147. Beta = 0.10, not significant.
148. Overall, 4% of the variance was explained.
149. Beta = 0.22, p < 0.001.
150. Beta = 0.13, p < 0.05.
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government would shape its effectiveness. 151 Overall, people believed
that both procedural justice and trust shape reactions to the
government.
Did the elements of the rule of law matter? Three indices reflecting
the rule of law were created to assess views about the regulatory
agency. Deference reflected the degree to which decisions were made
in neutral, rule-based ways.152 Respect for people's rights as citizens
was also measured.1 53 Finally, respect for persons-treatment with
dignity-was assessed.1 54
The factors that shaped judgments about the procedural justice of
the regulatory agency were whether it showed respect for citizens'
rights, 155 respect for persons, 156 and the favorability of its outcomes. 157
Factors that mattered in shaping trust in the regulatory agency were
rule-based decisionmaking, 158 respect for persons, 59 and respect for
rights. 60 Factors that shaped whether people wanted a government,
as opposed to a market, solution were respect for rights 61 and out-
come favorability.' 62 Factors that shaped whether people said they
would voluntarily defer to government rules163 were respect for
rights' 64 and outcomes.' 65 Finally, factors shaping whether respon-
dents thought that the government was likely to be effective were re-
spect for rights 166 and outcomes. 67 Hence, respect for persons and
for rights consistently shaped reactions to government decisions.
151. Beta = 0.09, not significant; overall, 10% of the variance was explained.
152. I selected two questions: (1) "The commission would get the information it needed to
make good decisions" and (2) "The commission would give you plenty of opportunity to make
your arguments and be heard." Tyler & Degoey, supra note 136, at 486.
153. I selected one question: "The commission would respect your rights as a citizen." Id.
154. I selected two questions: (1) "The commission would treat you politely" and (2) "The
commission would treat you fairly." Id.
155. Beta = 0.16, p < 0.05.
156. Beta = 0.14, p < 0.05.
157. Beta = 0.20, p < 0.001; overall, 20% of the variance was explained, 17% by the indices of
the rule of law.
158. Beta = 0.39, p < 0.001.
159. Beta = 0.28, p < 0.001.
160. Beta = 0.11, p < 0.001; overall, 48% of the variance was explained, 48% by the indices of
the rule of law.
161. Beta = 0.14, p < 0.05.
162. Beta = 0.10, p < 0.05.
163. Only 2% of the variance was explained, 1% by the indices of the rule of law.
164. Beta = 0.24, p < 0.001.
165. Beta = 0.13, p < 0.05; 7% of the variance was explained, 5% by the indices of the rule of
law.
166. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.01.
167. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.01; 6% of the variance was explained, 3% by the indices of the rule of
law.
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Overall, this study suggested that the procedural justice of govern-
ment is central to the willingness of citizens to give their representa-
tives the authority to manage a community problem, and that
procedural justice, in turn, is linked to issues of the rule of law. In
particular, evidence of respect for people's rights and for people them-
selves were key antecedents of viewing the government as procedur-
ally just. In this situation, respect for people's rights emerged as a key
factor in people's willingness to defer to government authority. Trust
in authorities was also important, and was shaped by similar factors.
2. Public Versus Private Distribution Problems
More recently, Professor Harris Sondak and I examined the factors
that shape whether people want to use markets to resolve conflicts.' 68
Two types of conflict were explored. First, respondents were
presented with public conflicts involving the allocation of benefits and
burdens. The benefit involved increased police patrols for some
neighborhoods, while the burden was accepting a halfway house in
one's neighborhood. 169 Other respondents were presented with pri-
vate conflicts involving their workplace. 170 The benefit was a desira-
ble work feature-a good parking spot-while the burden was having
to work on a holiday. 171
a. Methodology
People were asked about the ability of the procedure to produce an
outcome that they would be willing to accept. Two procedures were
presented. 72 The first was a market solution. In the public conflict
scenario, the solution was to give the increased police patrols to the
community willing to pay the most for them, and to give the halfway
house to the community willing to accept the least amount of money
to house it. In the private conflict scenario, the solution was to give
168. Harris Sondak & Tom R. Tyler, How Does Procedural Justice Shape the Desirability of
Markets? (May 19, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id. at 6. The design of the study involved random allocation of respondents to the com-
munity or work condition. However, those respondents assigned to the work condition were
screened for working at least half-time. If the respondents did not meet these conditions, they
were assigned to the community condition. Hence, more people ended up in the community
condition than in the work condition. Id. at 7.
171. Id. at 6.
172. Id. Every respondent rated market solutions and one of eight other solutions. The only
one of the eight nonmarket solutions discussed here is having an authority make the decision.
Hence, the number of people rating that solution is lower than the number rating the market
solution. The means presented are only for that subset of respondents who compared markets to
the use of authorities.
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the parking spot to the person willing to pay the most for it, and give
the holiday assignments to those employees willing to work on holi-
days for the least additional compensation. The second solution was
having an authority in the community or work organization decide
what was best.
b. Analysis
In general, people prefer having an authority make public alloca-
tion decisions to making those decisions through the market (mean =
3.64 for authority versus 3.07 for market on a scale of 1 to 7, with
higher numbers being more desirable). Again, with private conflicts,
people prefer having an authority make the allocation decision to
making that decision through a market (mean = 4.12 for authority ver-
sus 3.35 for market).
To understand why people prefer procedures in which authorities
make the decisions, the study examined the role of procedural jus-
tice, 173 trust, 174 and expected outcome favorability 75 in shaping the
anticipated willingness to accept the decisions of the third-party au-
thority.176 For public disputes, 65% of the variance in deference to
authorities is explained by judgments about their procedural justice,
trustworthiness, and anticipated outcome favorability. 177 Each factor
was important, with significant influences found for procedural jus-
tice,178 trust,179 and anticipated outcome favorability. 80 In this case,
procedural justice judgments mattered more than trust. For private
disputes, 66% of the variance is explained. In this case, procedural
173. I selected one question: "How fair do you think this procedure is for resolving this is-
sue?" Sondak & Tyler, supra note 168, at 7.
174. I selected one question: "How much do you trust this procedure to lead to a decision
that takes account of your needs and concerns?" Id. at 7-8.
175. I selected one question: "How likely is it that you would get the outcome you wanted
using this procedure?" Id. at 8.
176. People also varied in their willingness to accept market solutions, but the factors shaping
the acceptability of markets are not considered here. Id. at 8-10.
177. Because people are choosing a procedure that will be used to make an allocation in the
future, there is no outcome. People were asked about the outcome they expected to receive if a
particular allocation procedure was used to make the decision.
178. Beta = 0.39, p < 0.001.
179. Beta = 0.12, p < 0.001.
180. Beta = 0.38, p < 0.001. Studies typically find that when people are asked to choose proce-
dures that will occur in the future, they give greater weight to anticipated outcome favorability
than they do when they are evaluating procedures after they have experienced them. After
people have been in a procedure, procedural aspects of their experience dominate their evalua-
tions, and the outcome of the procedure becomes relatively less important. See Tom R. Tyler,
Yuen J. Huo & E. Allan Lind, The Two Psychologies of Conflict Resolution: Differing Anteced-
ents of Pre-experience Choices and Post-experience Evaluations, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTER-
GROUP REL. 99, 114 (1999).
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justice was central,' 8' with a lesser influence from outcomes. 182
Again, procedural justice judgments mattered more than trust. In
both public and private allocations, the procedural justice of the third-
party procedure was central to the anticipated willingness to defer to
its decisions, with trust playing a secondary role.
What about the role of judgments reflecting the elements of the rule
of law? To examine the importance of the rule of law, indices of rule-
based decisionmaking, 183 respect for rights,' 84 and respect for per-
sons ' 85 were created and combined with anticipated outcome
favorability to examine the factors shaping the willingness to defer to
decisions.
In public disputes, procedural justice was shaped by respect for per-
sons, 186 respect for rights, 87 and expected outcome favorability. 188 In
private disputes, procedural justice was shaped by respect for per-
sons, 189 respect for rights,1 90 rule-based decisionmaking, 19' and ex-
pected outcome favorability.' 92 In public disputes, trust is shaped by
respect for persons, 193 respect for rights, 194 rule-based decisionmak-
ing,195 and expected outcome favorability. 96 In private disputes, trust
is shaped by respect for persons, 197 respect for rights,198 rule-based
decisionmaking,' 99 and expected outcome favorability.200 With public
disputes, deference is shaped by respect for persons, 20 respect for
rights, 20 2  rule-based decisionmaking, 203  and expected outcome
181. Beta = 0.58, p < 0.001.
182. Beta = 0.27, p < 0.001.
183. 1 selected one question: "How likely is it that relevant issues would be discussed and
relevant facts considered?" Sondak & Tyler, supra note 168, at 7.
184. 1 selected one question: "How likely is it that your rights would be respected?" Id. at 8.
185. 1 selected one question: "How likely is it that the problem would be resolved in a digni-
fied way that treated everyone with respect?" Id.
186. Beta = 0.32, p < 0.001.
187. Beta = 0.17, p < 0.001.
188. Beta = 0.37, p < 0.001; overall, 61% of the variance was explained.
189. Beta = 0.24, p < 0.001.
190. Beta = 0.34, p < 0.001.
191. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.01.
192. Beta = 0.23, p < 0.001; overall, 60% of the variance was explained.
193. Beta = 0.23, p < 0.001.
194. Beta = 0.38, p < 0.001.
195. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.001.
196. Beta = 0.23, p < 0.001; overall, 65% of the variance was explained.
197. Beta = 0.25, p < 0.001.
198. Beta = 0.37, p < 0.001.
199. Beta = 0.09, p < 0.05.
200. Beta = 0.33, p < 0.001; overall, 55% of the variance was explained.
201. Beta = 0.15, p < 0.001.
202. Beta = 0.12, p < 0.001.
203. Beta = 0.10, p < 0.001.
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favorability. 20 4 With private disputes, deference is shaped by respect
for persons, 20 5  respect for rights, 20 6  and expected outcome
favorability. 20 7
These findings generally suggest that, in both public and private set-
tings, people placed great emphasis on respect for rights and for peo-
ple when deciding whether using an authority would be a good way to
resolve a dispute and whether they would be'willing to accept deci-
sions arising from such procedures, and less emphasis on rule-based
decisionmaking. This was true regardless of whether the decision in-
volved a public or a private allocation. People also wanted proce-
dures that would give them the outcomes they favored.
More generally, these results suggest that people want authorities to
make allocation decisions, so long as those authorities act in accord
with the rule of law. In particular, the desirability of having authori-
ties make decisions is rooted in the anticipated respect for rights and
for persons. When people anticipate receiving respect from authori-
ties, they strongly support the idea of having them make decisions. In
addition, it is clear that people consistently choose procedures that
they anticipate will lead to desirable outcomes. Therefore, people do
not simply respond to the rule of law-they also like to win!
Our findings came out of studies that presented people with hypo-
thetical scenarios about future allocations. However, the study of the
NYPD also asked participants about hypothetical issues of public and
private ordering. People were asked whether they feel that police ser-
vices should be allocated by need or by equity. Overall, 90% indi-
cated that equal services are fair; 96% indicated that need is best and
37% indicated that those who pay more taxes deserve higher pa-
trols.20 8 This distinction between principles is important since both
need and equity require giving discretionary authority to the police.20 9
If people did not want the authorities to have decisionmaking power,
they should prefer equal allocations, which minimize the authority of
the police.
204. Beta = 0.51, p < 0.001; overall, 60% of the variance was explained.
205. Beta = 0.25, p < 0.001.
206. Beta = 0.22, p < 0.001.
207. Beta = 0.36, p < 0.001; overall, 56% of the variance was explained.
208. These data are from an unpublished study; they are on file with the author.
209. People often prefer to allocate resources equally because it does not require an authority
to make discretionary decisions about merit or need. David M. Messick & Terry Schell, Evi-
dence for an Equality Heuristic in Social Decision Making, 80 ACrA PSYCHOLOGICA 311 (1992)
(arguing that using equality as a decision rule is preferred in situations in which people do not
want to distinguish among people).
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One way that police services can be allocated is by need, with high
crime areas receiving the greatest number of police officers. This is, in
fact, the most widely endorsed approach to allocating police re-
sources. Why would people support giving the police the power to
make such need-based decisions? Analysis indicates that if people
think that the police exercise their authority with procedural justice
and are trustworthy, they are more likely to support policing based
upon need. In contrast, the effectiveness of police performance in
fighting crime is not significantly related to support for need-based
policing.
What about the generally unfair policy of giving more police ser-
vices to affluent areas? People are more supportive of this approach
if they trust the police. Again, the effectiveness of police performance
is not related to support for equity. People are supportive of giving
authority to the police when they believe that the police are trustwor-
thy and follow fair procedures.
People, in other words, are giving the police authority to the degree
that the police are viewed as exercising that authority in appropriate
ways. The police are not being given authority because they are re-
garded as better at fighting crime; rather, the fairness of their actions
is being assessed.
E. Trust and Confidence in the Law
This argument incorporates several different judgments that mem-
bers of the public make about law and legal authorities. Those judg-
ments include the justice of the procedures by which legal authorities
exercise their authority, trust in the motivations underlying the deci-
sions of those authorities, and the three elements associated with the
rule of law: rule-based decisionmaking, respect for people's rights,
and respect for persons. In considering the argument that public sup-
port for legal authorities is declining, I will focus on trust and
confidence.
Legal authorities generally recognize the importance of having the
trust and confidence of the public:
A court that does not have the trust or confidence of the public
cannot expect to function for long as an effective resolver of dis-
putes, a respected issuer of punishments, or a valued deliberative
body. This is true regardless of whether we are talking about a trial
court or the supreme appellate court. 210
210. David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What
Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, 36 CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 24, 24.
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Relatively good data on trust and confidence in local and national in-
stitutions are available. Using national indices of trust and confi-
dence, we can ask whether trust and confidence are declining. The
background for this discussion is the evidence of declining trust in the
government.211 For example, responses to the question, "How much
of the time can you trust the government to do what is right?" are said
to show a decline in trust from the 1950s to recent years.212 This argu-
ment extends beyond the government to include other major
institutions.21 3
It would be tempting to conclude from this argument that there is
an increasing lack of confidence in the law, in police, and in courts.
But I do not think that such an argument is supported by the evidence
that is currently available in public opinion polls. First, it is important
to note that a rich body of historical ratings of government and busi-
ness is not available in the area of law and courts. Any conclusions
are, as a result, more speculative than conclusions regarding trust in
government.
A major source of information on public views about law, courts,
and the police is the sourcebook provided by the National Institute of
Justice. 214 Public trust and confidence in legal authorities can be ex-
plored using the data provided in that sourcebook. The first focus of
concern is the police. Americans were asked whether they believe
that the police generally have high levels of ethics. 21 5 Respondents
were also asked whether they have a great deal of trust in the po-
lice. 216 The findings from this study suggest two conclusions. First,
211. See generally Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN.
REV. POL. Sci. 475 (2000). Interestingly, these authors suggest that "despite all the verbiage
decrying the decline in trust, there is little actual evidence of a long-term secular decline, either
in the United States or in Western Europe." Id. at 483. In particular, trust has moved both up
and down since the mid 1970s in the United States.
212. GARY LAFREE, LOSING LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS IN AMERICA 100-04 (1998).
213. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BusI-
NESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND 60 (1983) (reporting the results of a
survey about trust in institutions including the Church, the Armed Forces, and the Legal
Profession).
214. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE (2005), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook.
215. The percentage of respondents indicating th2t the police have high levels of ethics ranged
from 37% in 1977 to 59% in 2003. Id. tbl.2.20.2005, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t2202005.pdf.
216. The percentage of respondents indicating high levels of confidence in the police ranged
from 52% in 1993 to 64% in 2004. Id. tbl.2.10.2005, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t2102005.pdf.
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trust and confidence in the police are not declining, and may even be
rising. Second, general levels of trust and confidence are low.
Local courts were evaluated using two questions. The first question
was whether respondents had a great deal of trust and confidence in
the criminal justice system. This question does not specifically target
courts, but rather reflects general views about police, courts, and the
law. There is no evidence that trust and confidence are declining.217
But the suggestion that trust and confidence are low is supported even
more strongly than is the case with the police.
Finally, the surveys measure trust and confidence in the Supreme
Court.2t8 Between 70% and 90% of respondents expressed low levels
of trust and confidence in the Court. As was true with local legal au-
thorities, these responses do not suggest that trust in the Court is de-
clining, but it is low.
It is difficult to know what level of public trust legal authorities
need to do their jobs well.219 Beyond the general recognition that
higher levels of trust and confidence are better, it is uncertain whether
the low levels of trust and confidence found in these studies ought to
be a matter of concern for legal authorities. Within the literature on
trust in government, arguments about the dangers of low levels of
trust are more fully developed. 220
The findings suggest that trust and confidence in the legal system,
while they may be low, are not declining. Hence, the evidence does
not suggest that decreasing trust and confidence are fueling greater
privatiiation. However, it seems clear that the American public is not
rejecting either the rule of law or the possibility of third-party regula-
tion. On the contrary, people generally appear willing to defer to au-
217. Results indicate that 17% had confidence in 1993 and 34% had confidence in 2004. Id.
When asked whether the local courts sentenced criminals severely enough, the results ranged
from 9% saying yes in 1985 to 18% in 2002. Id. tbl.2.47.2005, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t2472005.pdf.
218. When asked whether they have a great deal of confidence in the Court, the percentage
has remained consistent, 45% agreed in 1979 and similarly 46% agreed in 2004. Id. tbl.2.10.2005,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t2102OO5.pdf.
219. Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 847
(1998) (addressing this issue using public opinion poll data). Data suggest that, while trust and
confidence are low, people have a strong sense that they should obey legal rules and the deci-
sions of legal authorities. Thus, "people can feel dissatisfaction about the operation of legal
institutions and the actions of legal authorities without losing their feelings of obligation to obey
the law." Id. at 865; accord Tom R. Tyler, A Deference-Based Perspective on Duty: Empowering
Government to Define Duties to Oneself and to Others, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RIGHTS AND
DUTIES: EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND NORMATIVE COMMENTARIES 137 (Norman J. Finkel
& Fathali M. Moghaddam eds., 2005).
220. See, e.g., Levi & Stoker, supra note 210.
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thorities who make decisions in ways consistent with the ideas
underlying the rule of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
My argument suggests two conclusions. First, Americans are
strongly committed to the ideas enshrined in the concept of the rule of
law. Those ideas shape reactions to both local and national legal au-
thorities. Further, they influence both the willingness to accept deci-
sions and the willingness to empower legal authorities to resolve
problems and make rules.
Second, there is evidence that the legal system is not viewed as liv-
ing up to those ideals. From my reading, that evidence is more sup-
portive of the view that there are low levels of trust and confidence,
rather than of evidence of decline. The data suggest that trust and
confidence are low, and have been low for several decades.
If we combine this evidence of low levels of trust with earlier find-
ings that suggested legal authorities do not follow rule of law princi-
ples, a consistent picture of mild discontent emerges. The evidence
does not support an alarmist view or suggest that the public is losing
faith in law or in legal authorities. It suggests that people view legal
authorities in generally positive ways, but they also see flaws; those
flaws seem more important with courts than they do with the police.
One important caveat is that the evaluations of local courts are
more directly aimed at criminal law than at civil law. However, many
of the issues that people deal with in courts are civil issues. Hence,
the attention of public opinion polls has been toward only one aspect
of legal authority, and one toward which the public might have more
negative views.
The primary way that people have personal experience with the po-
lice is when they approach officers and ask for help. The police en-
force laws and impose sanctions upon the public, but that is not their
primary mode of contact with people in the communities in which
they work. Hence, both courts and the police have an important ser-
vice provision function that goes beyond sanctioning criminal conduct.
The data I have outlined have implications for the causes of decline
in public trust and confidence in the law, courts, and the police. They
also have implications for fixing those problems. These findings also
suggest the value of building public trust and confidence by designing
court procedures that lead the people who personally deal with the
courts to have positive experiences. Based on the Rottman study, ef-
forts should concentrate on traffic, family, and juvenile courts, where
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dissatisfaction is currently high. They should be directed at all mem-
bers of the community who deal with the legal system, since the same
survey indicates that jury duty or serving as a witness also educates
people about the legal system.
What type of reform is needed? The specifics will vary depending
upon the particular context. However, some general arguments can
be made. First, consider the many people who come to court to be
involved in a case as jurors and as witnesses. What could be done to
improve their experiences with courts?
First, it is important to provide people with information acknowl-
edging their rights and to give them a contact person to whom they
can express concerns and complaints if they feel mistreated. Respect
for people is enhanced if this person has reasonably high status within
the organization (e.g., the chief judge, the police chief) or if the organ-
ization has created someone to represent those in the public who have
concerns (e.g., an ombudsperson, an ethics'officer). People value the
acknowledgement of their rights and status. The right to go to the
courts to seek justice is central to the meaning of membership in our
democratic society. Thus, it is important to people to have those
rights acknowledged when they seek to use the courts. In general,
people react to whether they feel treated with politeness, dignity, and
respect.
It is also important to explain procedures and account for decisions.
Providing people with information that explains how the courts work
in ways that make clear what they heed to do and what is going to
happen is central to creating trust. When legal authorities make deci-
sions, they need to explain why they are deciding as they are, regard-
less of who wins or loses. It is particularly helpful if authorities
acknowledge the concerns of those involved, and indicate that they
have considered those concerns when making their decisions, regard-
less of whether they can give people what they have asked for. Un-
derstanding how things work and why events are happening are
strongly associated with viewing procedures as fair.
Many people come to court because they are parties to a case. The
issues already raised apply to those with cases before the courts be-
cause research suggests that fair procedures and trustworthy authori-
ties are important antecedents of satisfaction with how one's case is
handled. Those before the courts also want an opportunity to explain
the concerns that brought them to court. Studies suggest that people
are much more willing to accept third-party decisions about how to
resolve their disputes if they feel they have had a chance to tell their
stories.
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When a decision is being presented, authorities should emphasize
that it accords with the ideas underlying the rule of law. In particular,
they should explain the decision by reference to rules and legal princi-
ples that show the decision is not based upon personal prejudice or
bias. People are more accepting of a decision if they understand the
principle of law behind it. When decisions go against a person, it is
important to show that the decision was made by properly applying
rules to the relevant facts. Authorities should also communicate that
people's concerns were heard and taken seriously. If possible, they
should acknowledge valid issues that were raised by the parties, even
when indicating that those concerns cannot be addressed. People fo-
cus heavily upon whether the authority considers the needs and per-
spectives they have 'expressed, especially when the decision goes
against them.
In general, the ideas underlying the rule of law provide clear guide-
lines for how decisions should be made and explained. Those guide-
lines provide for rule-based decisionmaking, respect for people's
rights, and for the standards and principles of the law. And the rules
provide for respect for people, as reflected in treatment with dignity,
courtesy, and respect. These elements of the exercise of authority
lead people to view decisionmaking procedures as just and to regard
the authorities involved in making them as trustworthy.
Of course, many people lack personal experience with the legal sys-
tem. In particular, studies suggest that people are much more likely to
have had personal contact with the police than with courts. Hence,
there is also a larger public audience whose image of the legal system
is more abstract. However, the ideas outlined apply to presentations
about the legal system directed at the general public audience.
Messages by court leaders should acknowledge people's right to use
the courts. Knowing that there is somewhere to go if citizens have
problems is an important part of living in a democracy.
Courts should emphasize their position as neutral authorities whose
role is to interpret and apply the law. The belief that courts make
decisions based upon the neutral application of principles to the facts
of particular cases is central to the legitimacy of the courts. Public
messages should be oriented toward the role of the courts in helping
people to deal with their problems. People must believe that the
courts are a place that people can go for justice, where judges care
about the concerns of citizens, listen to their grievances, and apply the
law to solve the real problems people face.
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